It is prudent for all those concerned in neonatal care to consider whether the care that they provide matches that that is technically and ethically demanded by society. The present time has never been more appropriate, for medical ethics has caught the imagination of the media, in particular the approach to the congenitally malformed baby. It is possible that the public interest has peaked as the subject is in danger of overexposure, there being a limited number of controversial situations and a limit to the number of times they can be discussed. Nevertheless, while the spotlight is on, it is a useful exercise to rationalise decision making and examine the possibility of a wider professional input.
There are four contentious points: the justification of intensive care for the very low birthweight baby, the withdrawal of intensive care in the brain damaged baby, the non-treatment of malformed babies, and the personnel involved in decision making. The view of society (not pressure groups) that influences decisions that have to be made is that the fetus and the newborn are not yet endowed with the same rights as children or adults.
The malformed baby
The moral issues relevant to the preterm baby apply also to the baby with congenital malformations. Yet the fact that neonatologists find, for instance, the Down's syndrome baby with duodenal atresia a complex problem means that there are extra factors involved. These factors are the definition of the quality of life, the balancing of the baby's interest against the autonomy of the parental decision, and, finally, the withdrawal of special or even ordinary care.
It is completely avoiding the issue to refuse to define the quality of life. To suggest that a person who can achieve a physical and mental age of no more than 2, will remain totally dependent, and will be unable to communicate can have a good quality of life is wrong. It would be an evil person who would support a life of such wretched existence. Although our options may be limited by the attitudes of neurosurgeons, nearly all paediatricians consider that a spina bifida baby with a high lumbar lesion with no sphincter control and effectively paralysed below the waist should not be actively treated. In other words, the expected quality of life would be unacceptable. It is equally clear, however, that given the right background Down's syndrome children have a very reasonable quality of life. When the mongol baby has duodenal atresia an operation has to be performed that in this day and age cannot be described as an extraordinary measure. If such a baby were rejected he is not likely to be greatly disadvantaged in later life for not having known his genetic parents. Social services would inevitably be involved and a surgeon would be found to act in the best interests of the baby. The most difficult situation arises when intelligent, caring parents believe that when refusing surgery they are acting in the best interests of the baby and the existing family.
Despite the well publicised previous cases, there is no legal precedent for this dilemma. I believe that most paediatricians would be uncomfortable acquiescing to no surgery partially because of the practical problems involved. These should not, however, override a logical moral decision.
Professional involvement in decision making
The situation described above is most complex. A second medical opinion may be helpful, but it is an extremely experienced and sensitive paediatrician who can judge parental reaction as being representative in the period immediately after birth. Seemingly rational parents may not be acting in their own best interest, let alone the interests of the baby. The involvement of the family doctor is desirable, but I can see a role here for a sympathetic psychologist. This is not to advocate the American committee approach where the composition of the committee may turn out to be as unsatisfactory to the clinician as that for choosing a unit general manager. At the moment we continue to face the difficulties as and when they arise and in the absence of a better system confront the problems as Campbell advocates.7 x
In conclusion, certain generalisations must be stated. Each case should be treated on its individual merits without preconceived ideas. The decision made should be that which would reflect the overall moral view of that particular society at a given time. A baby is an unprotected individual who cannot express a view on the desirability to live, and the paediatrician must act primarily in his interest. What Lord Hailsham once said to Enoch Powell is for us a good guideline, 'Moderation in all matters'. There is no room for extreme views or practice in neonatology.
The series 'Philosophical Medical Ethics' by Dr Raanan Gillon running 1985-6 in the British Medical Journal is compelling reading. I have quoted perhaps inaccurately and out of context from this series and therefore have not acknowledged any particular article as a reference.
